Energy TransitionExplainer

EDB finds Central Asia could run 28.8 GW of its 36.4 GW at peak demand

The shortfall at the 10 December 2024 peak came from reserves, water, fuel and grid limits; better operation could add 6 billion kWh of trade a year.

Written with AI tools by Corridor Minerals' editorial system; the publisher is responsible for it. How this site works

Cover card: Central Asia power, Why Central Asia ran short of power capacity at peak

Power plants in the Central Asian Unified Power System could deliver only 28.8 GW of their 36.4 GW of installed capacity at the annual peak load on 10 December 2024, the Eurasian Development Bank said on 29 October.

The bank puts the capacity that was unavailable at around 6.6 GW, held back by cold reserve, hydrological and fuel constraints, the condition of equipment and limits on the network. The report's summary lists a further 0.85 GW under repair separately, which accounts for most of the 7.6 GW difference between the two totals; the remaining 0.15 GW is not explained and may reflect rounding. Its report on power connectivity in Central Asia, published as Energy Without Borders, argues that the region can make more electricity available through coordinated system operation, digital monitoring and phased market development, without building new power plants first.

Central Asian Unified Power System capacity at the peak load of 10 December 2024GW
Source: Eurasian Development Bank, Energy Without Borders: A Framework for Power Connectivity in Central Asia, summary, 29 October 2026

Installed capacity is not available capacity

Installed capacity is the nameplate total of every plant connected to the system. Available capacity is what can run at a given hour once plants kept in reserve, units under repair, plants short of water or fuel and lines that cannot carry the power are taken out. The bank's point is that the gap opened at the one hour of the year when the system needed every plant.

For a smelter or a mine on a long-term power contract, available capacity at the peak is the figure that counts. Kazakhstan alone reported 27.1 GW of capacity across 254 power sources at a government meeting on 29 October, where the vice minister of energy said generation reached a record 123.1 billion kWh last year against consumption of 124.6 billion kWh. Of the 2.45 GW of Chinese wind deals Kazakhstan signed in September, 1 GW is tied to an aluminium smelter.

Lines on the map, little trade

Cross-border electricity trade inside the unified system came to 12.1 billion kWh in 2024, which the bank calls well below the levels of mature regional markets. Digital monitoring, an accurate assessment of available transmission capacity and coordinated operation could add up to 6 billion kWh of trade a year without major construction, it estimates. Its scenarios put the gross benefit of deeper integration at up to US$640m a year and the net benefit, after integration costs, at up to US$120m a year.

Pressure is rising on both sides of the balance. Demand is growing by up to 6 per cent a year and could reach about 370 billion kWh by 2030, the bank says, while more than 35 GW of variable generation capacity is planned by 2035. Uzbekistan alone is projected to curtail between 2.1 billion and 3.5 billion kWh of renewable output a year in 2026 to 2028, electricity that plants could produce but the system could not take. Uzbekistan commissioned 300 MW of wind and 100 MW of storage in Karakalpakstan in September.

Five steps the bank proposes

The report sets five priorities: digital monitoring and commercial metering of deliveries; calculating and publishing available transmission capacity; grid reinforcements chosen on the rule of one constraint, one system-wide benefit, one project, each with measurable indicators; a market built in phases, from structured bilateral trade with clear rules for settling deviations to a regional day-ahead market and then balancing and ancillary services markets; and payment, under contract, for the flexibility of upstream hydropower.

Hydropower carries much of the argument. Toktogul, the Naryn cascade, Nurek and the planned Rogun plant provide regulation, peak supply and seasonal balancing for the region, and the bank argues that this flexibility should be treated as a paid system service with explicit rules, because water in Central Asia also serves irrigation, food security and interstate commitments on releases. It also warns that gains for the region as a whole do not mean even gains for each country, and that an economically beneficial project can stay politically difficult unless the sharing of gains is agreed in advance.

The report draws on operational data from the Energia Coordinating Dispatch Centre and also reviews links beyond the region, including the risks and conditions around CASA-1000 and the northern, eastern and trans-Caspian connections. On the Caspian side, Azerbaijan has one export link under way, two studied and one open, with a Central Asian study due in May 2027.

Sources

Assay notes

  1. EDB Proposes a Framework for Power Connectivity in Central Asia: Better System Management, Not Just More Power LinesEurasian Development Bank, Primary source, 29 October 2026
  2. Energy Without Borders: A Framework for Power Connectivity in Central AsiaEurasian Development Bank, Primary source, 29 October 2026
  3. 20-процентный профицит электроэнергии к 2029 году планируется сформировать в Казахстане (Kazakhstan plans a 20 per cent electricity surplus by 2029)Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (primeminister.kz), Primary source, 29 October 2026
  4. Energy Without Borders: A Framework for Power Connectivity in Central Asia, summaryEurasian Development Bank, Primary source, 29 October 2026